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THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF 
COMPETING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
Smaranda BOROŞ* 





The objective of this paper is to offer a clear view on the different conceptualizations 
of organizational identification and propose valid measurement solutions adapted to 
these conceptualizations. The theoretical analysis tries to unravel in which respects 
the different conceptualizations of organizational identification are distinct or 
similar, and which contradictions are insolvable or just apparent. The empirical part 
of this paper focuses on the analysis of the instruments built according to each of the 
presented theoretical model. Several modalities to test the content, convergent and 
discriminant validity of these instruments are employed to assess the fit of these 
instruments. Finally, measurements proposals that address the theoretical and 
methodological issues raised in the analyses are advanced. 
 
KEYWORDS: organizational identification, self-categorization, affective 
identification, organizational commitment. 
 
 
Organizational identification (OI) is a term populating the organizational 
studies literature ever since the 60’s (March & Simon, 1958; Kelman, 1961). Yet, it 
was only the last two decades that have witnessed a surge in interest in the 
organizational identification research. In between this period, organizational 
identification has been one of the Cinderellas of organizational studies, kept in the 
shadow of Organizational Commitment. In fact, since Mowday, Steer and Porter’s 
(1979) conceptualization of identification as a component of affective 
organizational commitment, these two concepts have been treated as synonyms, or 
the difference between them has only been of rhetorical nature rather than of true 
conceptual and measurement differentiation (see, for an example, Cheney’s [1983] 
scale of Organizational Identification). 
How is organizational identification defined in the field literature? A review 
of definitions points to the fact that by the same word are designated very different 
realities. The most obvious fact is its superposition with the concept of 
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organizational commitment. For instance, Meyer and Allen (1997) define 
organizational commitment as an attitude or an orientation that “links the identity 
of the person to the organization”, a process whereby the goals of the organization 
and those of the individual become congruent (Meyer & Allen, 1997). O’Reilly and 
Chatman (1986) define commitment as a psychological bond between the 
employee and the organization, but differentiate between three forms this bond can 
take: compliance, identification and internalization. They define identification as 
the process of “an individual accepting influence from a group (organization) in 
order to establish and maintain a relationship”. Hence, an individual may respect a 
group’s values without adopting them, as opposed to internalization (when 
influence is accepted because the induced attitudes/values are congruent with one’s 
own) or compliance (when the are declaratively accepted in order to win a certain 
benefit) (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986).  
A second problem is the heterogeneity of conceptualizations and 
measurement instruments of OI. For example, several studies have shown that 
different subtypes of identification (e.g., affective vs. cognitive) relate 
differentially to work outcomes (see Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; van Dick, Wagner, 
Stellmacher, & Christ, 2004; also Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). Thus, 
for specific purposes, more differentiated conceptualizations of OI may prove 
useful.  
The aim of the present paper is two-folded. On the one hand, we head for a 
theoretical analysis of competing organizational identification conceptualizations. 
The first of them (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) portrays identification as a solely 
cognitive process of self-categorization, and commitment as a possible 
consequence. The other (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999) envisions 
identification as a three-faceted process, comprising an affective component named 
commitment. We shall first present and then try to disentangle the apparent 
contradictions between these two perspectives. On the other hand, we shall analyze 
the correspondence between the theoretical models and the emerging instruments 
intended to measure this concept.  
 
FUNDAMENTALS IN THE STUDY OF OI 
 
For over two decades now, the most prominent theory in the study of 
organizational identification has been the social identity theory (SIT). According to 
SIT’s core assumptions, organizational identification is a form of social 
identification, whereby a person comes to view him- or herself as a member of a 
particular social entity - the organization. This happens through cognitive processes 
of categorization, where one forms self-categories of organizational membership. 
These are based on one’s similarities with others in the organization, as well as on 
the dissimilarities with individuals from different organizations (Turner, 1985; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Indeed, as one increasingly 
identifies with an organization, the individual self-perceptions of the members tend 
to become depersonalized such that members see themselves as interchangeable 
representatives of the social category that is the organization (e.g., Turner, 1985). 
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It is Ashforth and Mael (1989) that introduce the perspective of SIT in the 
study of organizational identification. In the most cited article in the field, they 
refine the concept of identification, differentiating among its cognitive, behavioural 
and emotional aspects, and discriminate between identification itself and its 
antecedents or consequences. Starting from the social identification theory, they 
define organizational identification as the perception of unity with or belonging to 
a social aggregate (in this case, an organization). In other words, they define 
identification as a form of self-categorization. They also postulate four principles 
of group identification, which clear much of the previous confusions. These 
principles are (Ashforth & Mael, 1989): 
1. Identification is a perceptual-cognitive concept, not necessarily associated 
with specific behaviours or emotional states. 
2. Group identification means experiencing at personal level the group’s 
successes or failures. 
3. Identification is different from internalization. Identification means 
referring to self in terms of a social category, while internalization means 
incorporating the group’s attitudes or values as guiding principles of one’s 
own behaviour. Accepting a social category as a definition of self does not 
imply also accepting the group’s values and attitudes. Moreover, 
identification is specific to each organization; internalization and 
commitment might not be, because several organizations may share 
common goals and values. Commitment might arise because that particular 
organization is a vehicle for one’s own career goals. This leads to the fact 
that leaving that organization for another one, where these goals can better 
be fulfilled, is a possibility at all times. Identification with an organization, 
however, means one cannot leave it without some kind of “psychic loss” 
(Levinson, 1970, apud Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
4. Group identification is similar to identification with an individual, in the 
sense that one defines oneself in terms of that social referent.  
Based on these assumptions, Mael and Ashforth (1992) built the 
Organizational Identification Scale (OIS), the most prevalent instrument for the 
assessment of OI in the extant literature (Riketta, 2005). In a recent meta-analysis 
of the organizational correlates of organizational identification, Riketta (2005) 
analyzes the results obtained using the Mael scale in comparison with other 
instruments measuring organizational identification.  
The author observes that results from studies using this scale were close to 
those from studies using other measures, as well as for the results that aggregate in 
a common index all measures. The only significant difference emerged in the 
category ‘work-related intentions and behaviour’, where the Mael scale correlated 
significantly less strongly with ‘intent to leave’ than did the other OI measures. 
Another important finding pointed to is that the correlations involving the Mael 
scale showed much less variation than the correlations involving all OI measures. 
For example, for several correlates (such as age and organizational satisfaction), 
the correlations from all OI studies were strongly and significantly heterogeneous 
(p < .001), whereas the correlations from studies using the Mael scale were not. He 
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concludes that studies using the Mael scale constitute a relatively homogenous 
subgroup within OI research with regard to their findings, and that the Mael scale 
seems to be the most representative OI measure with regard to its empirical 
outcomes. 
However, Bergami and Bagozzi (2000) argue that, although Mael and 
Ashforth’s (1992) scale measures overall organizational identification, it targets 
more than awareness of one’s membership in the organization, and includes 
potential causes, effects and correlates of identification. The authors point to the 
fact that three items in the scale reflect emotional responses that members might 
have when the organization is attacked or glorified: “When someone criticizes 
[organization], it feels like a personal insult”, “When someone praises 
[organization], it feels like a personal compliment”, and “If a story in the media 
criticized [organization], I would feel embarrassed”. Two other items in the Mael 
scale appear to measure variables that can shape or impact one’s identification: “I 
am very interested in what others think about [organization]” and “This 
[organization’s] successes are my successes”. Only one item in Mael’s scale might 
be considered a measure of self-categorization: “When I talk about [organization], 
I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’”. But it might be argued that even this item is 
as much a reflection or consequence of self-categorization as it is a measure of the 
central meaning of awareness of one’s membership per se (Bergami & Bagozzi, 
2000). 
The other fundamental perspective in the study of OI was put forth by 
Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail (1994). They define organizational identification as 
the degree to which a member defines himself or herself by the same attributes that 
he or she believes define the organization. Strong organizational identification 
occurs when, (1) one’s organizational identification is more salient than alternative 
identities, and (2) his or her self-concept has many of the same characteristics he or 
she believes define the organization as a social group. The members of an 
organization are said to become attached to their organization when they 
incorporate the characteristics attributed to the organization into their self-concept. 
In this perspective, the self-concept refers to “the totality of self-descriptions and 
self-evaluations subjectively available to an individual” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
This is in line with Social Categorization Theory’s (SCT) fundamental assumptions 
on the mechanisms underlying social identification, namely depersonalization. 
Depersonalization is defined as “a process of self-stereotyping, through which the 
self comes to be perceived as categorically interchangeable with other ingroup 
members” (Haslam, 2001, p. 44). 
Dutton et al. (1994) propose three ways of operationalizing the strength of 
identification: (1) directly assessing it, through scale-based measures; (2) by asking 
organizational members to evaluate a set of identities and indicate the relative 
degree to which these identities accurately describe them as individuals, either by 
ranking each identity or ranking them in hierarchy; (3) directly assessing the level 
of overlap between the characteristics by which an individual describes him- or 
herself and the characteristics that typify the organization.  
S. Boroş 
 
Cognition, Brain, Behavior 12 (2008) 1-27 
5 
To summarize, the two most cited definitions of OI, which represent the 
bases for current developments of the topic, reflect a social-categorization 
perspective on identification. While Mael’s definition focuses exclusively on the 
act of categorization, Dutton et al. extend the definition to include the mechanisms 
of social categorization, namely depersonalization. 
 
PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS OF OI 
 
Further on, we shall focus on the present developments of the 
conceptualization and operationalization of organizational identification, and their 
contribution to the study of OI. The conceptual refinement of organizational 
identification has known an intense, yet quite divergent development in the last 
decade. We can outline three mainstreams in researchers’ interest: the first one 
challenges the initial definition of OI in positive terms, as an affirmative relation 
between the individual and the organization, introducing concepts such as 
disidentification, ambivalent and neutral identification with the organization 
(Dukerich et al., 1998; Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). 
The second (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000) 
stems from fundamental SIT research and opposes the definition of OI as an 
exclusively cognitive concept (according to Ashforth & Mael, 1989) to Tajfel’s 
initial definition of social identity, which also comprises an emotional and an 
evaluative side. Concerned with the accuracy of predicting subsequent behaviour, 
the third stream (van Knippenberg & van Schie, 2000; Riketta & van Dick, 2005; 
van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006) changes the focus of organizational 
identification, from this exclusively global level, to a multiple-level analysis, 
starting from the work-group, moving up to the organization and finally the 
occupation. Further on, we shall tackle more extensively the first two mentioned 
streams. 
 
Organizational identification, disidentification, ambivalent and neutral 
identification 
 
The first-mentioned stream developed from Dutton et al.’s (1994) definition, 
and inquired on all four dimensions obtained through the high-low superposition of 
attributes between the self and the organization (Dukerich et al., 1998; Ellemers et 
al., 2002; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). Hence, three new concepts have been 
introduced: disidentification, ambivalent identification (the simultaneous 
identification and disidentification with the organization), and neutral identification 
(the explicit absence of both identification and disidentification with the 
organization) (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). 
Organizational disidentification is defined as “a self-perception based on (1) 
a cognitive separation between one’s identity and one’s perception of the identity 
of an organization, and (2) a negative relational categorization of oneself and the 
organization” (Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001). By analogy with Dutton, Dukerich, 
and Harquail’s (1994) definition of organizational identification, organizational 
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disidentification is indicated by the degree to which a person defines him or herself 
as not having the same attributes that define the organization. 
Unlike “neutral identification” (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004), “apathetic 
identification” (Dukerich, Kramer, & McLean Parks, 1998) or “nonexistent or 
broken identifications” (Pratt, 1998), in which a person neither connects nor 
separates his or her identity from the organization, or, at the extreme, does not even 
have an opinion or knowledge about the organization, disidentification is a form of 
relational categorization (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). However, in the case of 
disidentification, the definition of self is through counter-positioning to the 
defining values and attributes of the organization. A disidentified member 
maintains “a sense of self-distinctiveness through perceptions and feelings of 
disconnection” (Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001). 
In other words, disidentification is a self-categorization in the form of 
cognitive dissociation from the group or organization. Regarding the dynamics of 
the triggers of social categorization, disidentification is related to the predominance 
of one’s needs for distinctiveness over one’s needs for inclusiveness. Unlike the 
processes underlying identification as self-categorization, one seeks to reduce 
similarities with the group members and stress his or her own distinctiveness. The 
concept of “optimal distinctiveness” (Brewer, 1991) is this time attained by 
extreme differentiation from the group. 
In their study on the National Rifle Association, Elsbach and Bhattacharya 
(2001) offer the best developed framework of organizational identification so far. 
Among the antecedents of disidentification, they postulate: (1) perceptions that 
one’s personal values conflict with the values of the organization; (2) perceptions 
that an organization’s reputation might affect one’s social identity; (3) perceptions 
that the members of the organization are “all the same”; and (4) perceptions of the 
organization that are based on a lack of personal experience with the organization 
or its members. Among the consequences of organizational disidentification, they 
postulate counter-organizational action and organizational criticism.  
Other consequences of organizational disidentification are set forth by 
Dukerich, Kramer, and McLean Parks (1998). They assert that, for the 
organization, the consequences of disidentification are, among others, the fact that 
disidentified members tend to rebel and resist organizational initiatives and goals, 
just because they had been proposed by the organization. These members would 
also generate a presumptive distrust among the other members of the organization. 
On the other hand, in time they would be perceived as malcontents, and the valid 
criticisms they may raise would be given little or no attention (Dukerich et al., 
1998).  
However, besides subscribing to a trend in SIT research that postulates 
identification and disidentification to be negatively correlated, but not opposite 
concepts, and that the core difference between the two resides in the fact that the 
latter involves extreme and simplified perceptions of the relationship between 
one’s identity and the identity of an organization (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & 
Ouwerkerk, 1999; Abrams & Hogg, 1999), Elsbach and Bhattacharya (2001) do 
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not investigate the mechanisms that produce disidentification, but place them in the 
‘further studies’ section.  
In fact, as Pratt (1998) notices, although disidentification is a concept that 
has won its place in the SIT literature, strangely enough, there are few empirical 
studies that investigate it, its mechanisms and correlates. One of these studies 
(Ellemers et al., 1999) stems from fundamental research and posits that 
disidentification, understood as cognitive distancing of a social identity from a 
group identity is due to the perception that one is distant from the group prototype 
or norm. These authors assume that disidentification with a group might be a 
defense mechanism used by low-identifiers as a means to pre-empting rejection 
from the group, or by those who want to ingratiate themselves with a more 
desirable group. 
The other highly cited study that focuses on the mechanisms of 
disidentification is Pratt’s (2000) case study of the Amway distributors. Basically, 
what Pratt (2000) postulates, beyond the Amway case, is that disidentification 
occurs when an organization shatters the meanings related to the self-concept 
(sensebreaking), creating in the member the need to seek for new meanings and 
attain them, but failing to provide the context and support for this (the sensegiving 
practices). 
It is Kreiner and Ashforth’s (2004) study that takes a more systematic 
approach on the matter, and includes in an integrated model of identification all the 
four dimensions postulated by previous studies (Pratt, 1998; Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002): identification, disidentification, ambivalent and neutral 
identification. They test these dimensions against some of the most relevant 
antecedents provided in the extant literature. Their findings regarding 
disidentification portray it as negatively associated with organizational reputation 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994) and the need for organizational 
identification (Glynn, 1998), and positively associated with negative affectivity, 
cynicism and psychological contract breach (Rousseau, 1998). It was also 
positively associated with intrarole conflict and organization identity incongruence. 
However, although being the most exhaustive model so far, Kreiner and Ashforth’s 
model was tested only in a correlational study, based on a cross-sectional survey; it 
does neither investigate underlying mechanisms, nor does it permit any safe 
conclusion regarding the direction of causality, given the strong potential for 
feedback loops over time, which would allow consequences to become antecedents 
and antecedents to be seen as consequences of disidentification (something that 
Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001, indicate as a limit of their own study, which is 
applicable in this case as well). 
Ambivalent identification is a dual state of both identification and 
disidentification to an organization. It can take the form of identifying with certain 
dimensions or traits of the organization’s identity, or of simultaneous identification 
and disidentification with the same traits (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). 
Among the antecedents that can trigger ambivalent identification, the extant 
literature has focused on the incongruence of the organization’s identity (Kreiner & 
Ashforth, 2004) and the negative image of the organization (Elsbach & 
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Bhattacharya, 2001). The predictions of social identity theory impose a refinement 
over the latter. A number of studies (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & Smith, 1984; 
Branscombe & Wann, 1999; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Spears, Doosje, & 
Ellemers, 1997; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997) have proved that individuals do 
not identify with social groups only as an instrument for self-enhancement, only to 
ditch them as soon as they no longer serve this purpose. Individuals continue to 
identify with a social group even through the bad times, when the negative image 
(or the low status) of the group actually affects their need for self-enhancement. 
This does not only occur as a result of objective conditions, such as low group 
permeability (translated in the impossibility of leaving the group and hence the 
need to search for alternative strategies to boost one’s social identity – strategies 
such as comparisons on different, more advantageous dimensions with the higher-
status group), but mainly on subjective premises, such as high initial levels of 
identification (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). Based on previous studies 
(Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997) that have proved the superiority of subjective 
conditions (i.e., high initial levels of identification) over objective ones (i.e., group 
permeability), it can be assumed that the emergence of ambivalent identification in 
situations of affected organizational image or prestige occurs mainly in those who 
have an increased need for identification. In low identifiers, the same objective 
situation will induce a subjective reaction of breaking up with the organization, 
either in the form of disidentification or of neutral identification.  
Based on the predictions of cognitive consistency theories (Heider, 1958; 
Festinger, 1957), ambivalent identification is not a state of mind that one can 
endure for a long time, which means that one will try to find strategies to come to 
terms with it. While cognitive dissonance theories predict a change of attitude that 
might solve the cognitive conflict, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) argues 
that, if dissonance is aroused by threats to one's general sense of self integrity, then 
people can effectively respond to these threats in ways not documented by the early 
dissonance researchers - that is, by affirming some other valued aspect of the self-
concept not necessarily related to the threat (e.g., although I smoke, I am a good 
mother). In other words, they count upon a shift of attention that would reduce the 
dissonance. Such researches proved that respondents do not focus on the 
information that flagrantly contradicts the dissonance-arousing behaviour, but 
instead choose to increase interest in, or identification with, "decision-congruent" 
aspects of the self.  
Recent studies, however, argue that rationalization and self-affirmation are 
not mutually exclusive protective mechanisms, but can occur simultaneously 
(Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995): dissonance can motivate individuals not only 
to make excuses for their behaviour, but, given certain circumstances, to 
incorporate these excuses into the self-image. What appears is an interplay between 
the multiple routes of self-affirmation, in which individuals not only change their 
attitudes towards the dissonant-arousing object, but also change relevant attitudes 
towards themselves as well. This interplay can explain why, in time, ambivalent 
identification can turn into disidentification, and how individuals who initially 
rejected disidentification get to feel at ease with it, by changing their very need for 
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identification. In this way, changes will be both in attitude (one decides to change 
the manner of relating to the organization, by defining oneself through opposite 
attributes than the ones used to define the organization), and in the self-concept, by 
a decrease in one’s general need for identification (which would give the final 
rationalization as to why they disidentify).  
Yet, there is evidence that this state of ambivalence can be maintained over 
long periods of time (Thompson & Holmes, 1996). This can lead to the assumption 
that ambivalent identification (AI) is a transient state for group members only when 
it is associated with a low need for identification, as in the mechanism described 
above. In this case, in time, AI will turn into disidentification. For people who 
preserve a high need for identification, ambivalent identification will persist over 
time, provided the external conditions remain stable, but its consequences will 
alter. SIT predictions state that in the case of a high need for identification, threat 
to the group will be met in terms of collective behaviour responses and group 
affirmation strategies (Ellemers et al., 2002). Hence, instead of disidentifying, 
these group members might try to act in order to improve the group status.  
 
Cognitive, affective and evaluative sides of social identity 
 
According to the primary definition proposed by Tajfel, social identity is 
“that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership” (1978, p. 63). 
Starting from Tajfel’s (1978) classic definition of social identity, Ellemers, 
Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999) proposed that three components contribute to 
one’s social identity: “a cognitive component (a cognitive awareness of one’s 
membership in a social group – self-categorization), an evaluative component (a 
positive or negative value connotation attached to this group membership – group 
self-esteem), and an emotional component (a sense of emotional involvement with 
the group – affective commitment)”.  
These authors first distinguished cognitive awareness of one's group 
membership per se (self-categorisation) from the extent to which one feels 
emotionally involved with the group in question (affective commitment). This 
distinction is based on empirical evidence proving that people who belong to the 
same social group may show differential responses, depending on the extent to 
which they feel affectively committed to that group (cf. Branscombe & Wann, 
1994; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997).  
While Ellemers et al. (1999) maintained the term ‘group commitment’ to 
refer to the emotional attachment towards a social group and used their own 
measure of this construct, other researchers (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000) preferred 
the term ‘affective commitment’ to describe emotional attachment to the 
organization. These authors used affective commitment in Meyer and Allen’s 
(1996) terms (i.e., as identification with, involvement in, and emotional attachment 
to the organization) and used the Affective Commitment Scale to assess the 
emotional side of organizational identification (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000). 
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Second, Ellemers et al. (1999) differentiated between the extent to which 
people feel emotionally involved with their group (affective commitment) from the 
value connotation of that particular group membership (group self-esteem). Pierce, 
Garner, Cummings, and Dunham (1989, p. 625) defined organization-based self-
esteem as “the degree to which organizational members believe that they can 
satisfy their needs by participating in roles within the context of an organization”. 
Ellemers et al. (1999) underlined that these two dimensions do not necessarily go 
together, nor can they be used interchangeably. They support their position with 
empirical evidence revealing that, provided their identity as members of a distinct 
social group is sufficiently important, people may show signs of strong emotional 
involvement while simultaneously acknowledging or even emphasizing the 
negative characteristics of their group (see Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996).  
In brief, Ellemers et al.’s conceptual analysis implies that self-categorization 
(the cognitive component) as well as affective commitment to a specific group (the 
emotional component) can be distinguished from group self-esteem derived from 
the value connotation of that particular group membership (the evaluative 
component). In addition to arguing for conceptual distinctions among the 
components of social identification, Ellemers et al. demonstrated that the 
components are empirically distinct and differentially affected by relative status 
and size of the group and the basis of group formation: relative group status affects 
mainly the evaluative component of social identity (group self-esteem), while 
relative ingroup size affects mainly the cognitive component or self-categorization 
aspect of ingroup identification. A consequence of these differential effects is that, 
if it is assumed that low group status negatively affects only the evaluative 
component of identification, while the level of affective commitment (the 
emotional component) can remain unchanged, it becomes clear that it is the 
combination of a threat to group self-esteem and strong affective commitment 
which should elicit attempts to depict the ingroup in a positive way. 
Furthermore, the affective component of identification is the main 
determinant of in-group favouritism. Ellemers et al.’s study proves that it is a sense 
of emotional involvement with the group (affective commitment), rather than the 
cognitive (self-categorisation) or evaluative (group self-esteem) component of 
ingroup identification which predisposes people to show ingroup favouritism. Their 
argument is that self-categorization provides a cognitive basis for performance of 
citizenship behaviours (pictured as a measure of ingroup favouritism), but that 
affective commitment and group self-esteem supply the motivational force. Hence, 
affective commitment and group self-esteem are hypothesized to be the direct 
determinants of citizenship behaviours, and cognitive organizational identification 
is expected to indirectly affect citizenship behaviours through affective 
commitment and group self-esteem.  
In an attempt to shed more light on the concept of organizational identity, 
Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2000) warn about the importance of keeping 
separate the notion of identification as a cognitive state of self-categorization from 
the process of comparing personal attributes with organizational attributes (in other 
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words, diferentiating the process of identification from its product – organizational 
identity). 
A recent theoretical review (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004) advances 
the three psychological processes that ultimately lead to the three dimensions of 
organizational identity, as defined by Ellemers et al. (1999). They build on the 
work of Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), who specified three intra-
psychological processes that underlie these group-based interactions: social 
categorization, social comparison and social identification. Social categorization 
refers to the fact that people organize social information by categorizing 
individuals into groups, which enables them to focus on the collective properties 
that are relevant for that particular situation. Social comparison is the process by 
which a social categorization is invested with meaning. By this process, people 
determine which features or behavioural norms help to define the group in a 
particular situation, so as to distinguish it as much as possible from other relevant 
comparison groups. Consequently, what defines members of the group may vary 
from one situation to the next, depending on the comparative context and the ways 
in which group members are distinct from others in that context. Social 
identification is the process by which information about social groups is related to 
the self. It refers to the inclination of a particular individual to perceive him- or 
herself as representative of a particular group, which makes the individual perceive 
characteristic group features as self-descriptive and leads him or her to adopt 
distinctive group norms as guidelines for his or her own behaviour. Social 
identification is primarily used to refer to a feeling of affective commitment to the 
group (i.e., the emotional component), rather than the possibility to distinguish 
between members of different social categories (the cognitive component) 
(Ellemers et al., 1999). According to Ellemers et al. (2004), the cognitive tool of 
social categorization and the evaluative implications of social comparison 
processes can elicit a person’s involvement with a particular social group (Ellemers 
et al., 1999): their sense of social identification.  
To summarize, the correspondence between the three processes and their 
identity dimensions are: social categorization – group categorization, social 
comparison – group self-esteem, and social identification – group commitment. 
Furthermore, this correspondence can be related to the underlined stages of these 
processes, as reflected by the occurrence of the three dimensions of identity. 
Bergami and Bagozzi (2000) demonstrated through structural equation modelling 
that the primary dimension of organizational identification is the cognitive one 
(group self-categorization), the other two dimensions being subsequent. 
This added chronological dimension in the analysis of the cognitive, 
emotional and evaluative sides of OI reconciles Ellemers’ and Ashforth’s positions. 
In this light, the difference between the two perspectives resides in the fact that 
Ashforth’s definition of OI stops at the primary process of self-categorization (and 
portrays the evaluative and emotional dimensions as consequences), while 
Ellemers encompasses in the same construct all three sides of identification, 
regardless of their chronological occurrence. In other words, while Ashforth is 
more preoccupied with the decantation of the basic process (like the search of a 
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primary number), Ellemers focuses on conceptual integration, not on artificially 




After having reviewed some of the most important theoretical advances in 
the study of organizational identification, we need to ask ourselves about their 
added value in empirical studies. Several questions need to be addressed at this 
point: is a one-dimensional conceptualization of OI preferable to a multi-
dimensional one, for the sake of parsimony, or is it too poor? Which one of the 
theoretical stances presented above is more relevant for research and has a better 
predictive validity? Which operationalizations of OI are preferable in what kind of 
researches and designs? In order to offer a base-line answer to these questions, we 
shall proceed to an exploratory inquiry (focused mainly on the validity and fidelity) 
of the most widely used OI scales which are based on the theoretical perspectives 
presented in the theoretical section.  
 
Respondents and procedure 
 
Our sample comprised 142 men and 308 women, with a mean age of 37.07 
years (ranging from 19 to 65). Out of these, 34.8% were single, 60.5% were 
married or living with someone, and 4.7% were divorced or widows. A percentage 
of 1% graduated only 8 classes, 48.5% were high-school graduates, 9.4% were 
college graduates, and 41.2% had at least a B.A. degree. The respondents came 
from different work fields and organizations, most of them from Transylvania. A 
proportion of 39.2 % worked in organizations with less than 50 employees, 23.2% 
in organizations with 50-100 employees, 15.4% in ones with 100-200 employees, 
9.6% in ones with 200-500 employees, and 12.7% in organizations with more than 
500 employees. Out of these organizations, 1.1% had less than a year of existence, 
14.3 % had 1-5 years, 10.9% had 5-10 years, and 73.8% had more than 10 years. 
The respondents were in their profession for an average of 12.08 years (median = 
10 years) and, on average, worked for their current employer for 9.34 years 
(median = 7 years).  
In the following studies, we used operationalizations for two of the 
theoretical perspectives advanced in this paper: that of organizational 
identification, disidentification, ambivalent and neutral identification (cf. Kreiner), 
and that of the cognitive, affective and evaluative sides of social identity (cf. 
Ellemers). For the first one, we adapted the corresponding four scales from Mael 
and Ashforth (1992), and Kreiner and Ashforth’s (2004) study. Organizational 
identification was measured with Mael’s (unpublished, 1988; Mael & Ashforth, 
1992) six-item scale (e.g., “When I talk about this organization, I usually say ‘we’ 
rather than ‘they’”). Disidentification, ambivalent identification, and neutral 
identification were measured with three corresponding scales developed by Kreiner 
(Kreiner, 2002; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). Each of these scales comprised six 
items. Organizational disidentification was operationalized such as to express self-
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definition via a cognitive and affective separation from the employing organization 
– when a person distances him- or herself from it, while nonetheless remaining a 
member of it. A sample item is “I have tried to keep the organization I work for a 
secret from people I meet”. Ambivalent identification was operationalized with 
items measuring mixed feelings about one’s association with the organization (e.g., 
“I find myself being both proud and embarrassed to be a part of this 
organization”). Neutral identification was operationalized with items measuring 
one’s lack of identification and disidentification with the employing organization 
(e.g., “I’m pretty neutral toward the success or failure of this organization”).  
For the second perspective, we employed Ellemers et al.’s (1999) Social 
Identification Scale, comprising of three subscales: self-categorization (e.g., “I 
identify with my organization”), group commitment (e.g., “I dislike being a 
member of this organization” – reverted item) and group self-esteem (e.g., “I think 
this organization has little to be proud of”).  
Ellemers et al. (1999) constructed their Social Identification Scale starting 
from 15 items assessing the three proposed theoretical dimensions. Out of these 15 
social identity items, principal component analysis revealed three interpretable 
factors defined by ten items, while five items either loaded on more than one 
factor, or did not load on any of these three factors. Therefore, only 10 items were 
retained for the final analyses. This revealed three factors with an Eigenvalue 
greater than 1, which together accounted for 65 per cent of the variance in the 
separate questions. The loadings of the separate questions on these three factors 
(after varimax rotation) clearly indicated that three subsets of questions constitute 
three different components (Ellemers et al., 1999).  
The first factor, defined by four items reflecting the evaluative consequences 
of group membership, was referred to as ‘group self-esteem’. The second factor 
comprised three questions referring to the inclusion of the self in the group, or self-
definition as a group member. Hence, it was termed ‘self-categorization’. The three 
questions with the highest loadings on the third factor were related to the group 
members' desire to continue acting as group members, and were therefore referred 
to as ‘commitment to the group’ (Ellemers et al., 1999).  
In addition to these instruments, we also used the Organizational 
Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979) and the Affective, 
Normative and Continuance Commitment Scale (Meyer & Allen, 1991) to test the 
discriminant validity of the OI scales.  
 Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 
1979). Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) developed OCQ as a 15-item instrument 
that would tap the three aspects of their definition of commitment as: "(1) a strong 
belief in and acceptance of the organization's goals and values; (2) a willingness to 
exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization; and (3) a strong desire to 
maintain membership in the organization" (Mowday et al., 1979, p. 226). The 
response format employed a seven-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly agree’ to 
‘strongly disagree’). Results are then to be summed and divided by 15 to arrive at a 
summary indicator of employee commitment. 
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Affective, normative and continuance commitment scale (Meyer & Allen, 
1991). Based on their conceptualization of commitment, Meyer and Allen 
developed the Affective, normative and continuance commitment scale (Meyer & 
Allen, 1991). Several confirmatory factor analyses (McGee & Ford, 1997; Meyer, 
Allen, & Gellatly, 1990; Cohen, 1996) showed that the best solution for the scale is 
a four-factor one, reflected in: (1) the affective commitment subscale – ACS (eight 
items; e.g., “I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this 
organization”), (2) the normative commitment subscale – NCS (six items; e.g., “I 
would not leave my organization right now, because I have a sense of obligation to 
the people in it”) and the continuance commitment subscale – CCS, divided into 
two, indicating two orthogonal factors, (3) high sacrifice (four items; e.g., “Too 
much in my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave my organization 
now”), and (4) lack of alternatives (four items; e.g.. “I feel that I have too few 
options to consider leaving this organization”).  
In adapting the instruments, we proceeded in the classical manner of 
translation and retroversion. The translation of instruments was performed by two 
psychologists with linguistic competence certificates. The two of them translated 
independently, and a third one chose and adapted the drafts. The final version was 
then submitted to retroversion by a fourth person and was afterwards compared to 
the original scales. A preliminary pilot study was then conducted on five 
respondents, to ensure the full and accurate understanding of the items. The choice 
of words was then changed accordingly, in order to be easily understood by a broad 
range of respondents. The scales were then applied to the respondents in the final 
sample, in a questionnaire that comprised all the mentioned scales, the outcome 
variables and the identification scales. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Construct validity. In order to investigate the adequacy of our data for a 
factor analysis, we tested the sample homogeneity using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure for sampling adequacy, the multicolinearity of the manifest variables 
using the determinant of the correlation matrix, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
The results are presented in Table 1. All the aforementioned indices proved that 
factor analysis is adequate for our data and sample.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for EFA for OI scales 
 M SD KMO Determin. of 
correl.matrix 
Bartlett test of 
sphericity 




1.63 0.94 .89 2.406 E-02 1663.02 
(p<0.0001) 
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We used the PCA extraction method for all the questionnaires. We opted for 
Quartimax rotation for the one-dimensional scales, and Direct oblimin rotation for 
the multidimensional ones (since their factors are supposedly intercorrelated).  
 
Table 2 
EFA and psychometric indices for OI scales  






Organizational identification scale 
(OIS) 
1 (60.64) .59-.88 .85 
Organizational disidentification (OD) 1 (68.34%) .74-.90 .90 
Ambivalent identification (AI) 1 (67.63%) .77-.88 .90 
Group identification (Ellemers) 2 F (62.29) .57-.87 .85 
 
As presented in Table 2, Mael and Ashforth’s organizational identification 
scale, as well as the three scales proposed by Kreiner and Ashforth to assess 
disidentification, neutral and ambivalent identification, offered satisfactory indices 
for the expected one-factorial solutions, with no problematic items. This was not 
the case, though, for Ellemers three-faceted scale of Social Identification.  
Our factor analysis did not reveal the same clarity of item loadings on the 
three theoretical dimensions proposed by the authors. Principal component analysis 
led to a two-factor solution, explaining 62.29% of the variation. The first scale 
(social categorization) indeed received consistent empirical support, although item 
4 loaded on this factor as well, in spite of its representing a commitment facet. As 
predicted, items 7, 9, and 10 loaded on the same factor, on a different scale 
(possibly representing group self-esteem, but also clustering all reversed items). 
Items 5, 6, and 8 did not clearly represent either factor (neither in the two-factor 
solution, nor in a forced three-factor one), loading on both (respectively all three) 
factors (see Table 4, Appendix).   
Based on this preliminary analysis, we suggest that the Self-Categorization 
and the Group Self-Esteem scales can be kept for further analysis, while the Group 
Commitment scale should be replaced by a more accurate measure of this 
dimension. Our suggestion is backed by Bergami and Bagozzi (2000), who, 
starting as well from Ellemers et al.’s (1999) three-faceted conceptualization, only 
kept the Self-Categorization scale in their research, using different instruments for 
the other two dimensions (namely, the ACS for group commitment, and an adapted 
self-esteem measure for group self-esteem). We suggest, however, keeping the 
group self-esteem scale as well, instead of adapting yet another instrument, for the 
sake of keeping as close as possible to the original researches we base ours on. 
Nevertheless, we shall analyze more in depth this scale and see, on the one hand, if 
it is fit for our purpose, and on the other, whether we can use it in its original form 
(given the loading of item 8). Our first option would be to keep it unchanged, given 
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Convergent and discriminant validity of OI scales. In order to further test the 
operationalization of organizational identification, we performed an exploratory 
factor analysis on the items of Mael’s Organizational Identification Scale and 
Ellemers’ Social Identification Scale, taken together. Considering the satisfactory 
descriptive indices (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .900, 
Bartlett's test of sphericity = 3158.187, p.000), a PCA extraction with oblimin 
rotation was performed. Both the Scree Plot and the Eigenvalues analysis revealed 
an optimal three-factor solution (see Table 5, Appendix), covering 61.52% of the 
variance.  
As one can notice from the inspection of Table 5 (Appendix) and Figure 1, 
all OIS items and Social Categorization items load on the same factor. This is in 
line with the argument we have stated earlier, that the core difference between 
Ashforth and Mael’s and Ellemers et al.’s conceptualization of organizational 
identification is not as radical as several authors pointed out, but relies mainly on 
the moment of analysis. As we have specified, based on the work of Bergami and 
Bagozzi (2000) and of Ellemers et al. (2004), social categorization is the 
identification process that occurs first. Hence, the conclusion that we can draw at 
theoretical level from this first study is that Ashforth and Mael’s conceptualization 
of OI as mainly self-categorization does not exclude the other dimensions of OI 
proposed by Ellemers et al., but merely stops at the primary dimension of a more 
complex process.  
ois 6
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Figure 1  
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As one can notice in Table 6 in the Appendix, the patterns of correlations 
between OI and OC scales are the expected ones. Both Mael’s (OIS) and Ellemers’ 
scales have medium to high correlations with all commitment scales (averaging 
around .60). Still, these correlations are not high enough to justify concept overlap. 
Scales that measure the same concept (such as OCQ and ACS) indicate much 
higher correlations (r = .76). The negative aspects of identification (i.e., 
disidentification, ambivalent and neutral identification) have significant negative 
correlations with all the other included scales, except those for continuance 
commitment. Albeit still negative, the correlations between them are not 
significant. In fact, considering their definitions and sources, we might have 
expected a positive correlation between these constructs. Out of all commitment 
forms, continuance commitment seems to be the least related to identification, 
regardless of its form or dimension. This is in line with the theory behind the 
construct, which states it to be a form of link to the organization, stemming from 
other sources than a real attachment towards it. Nevertheless, out of the general 
pattern of correlations (most of them significant), we can assume a global construct 
behind these disparate concepts, construct that we may call psychological 
attachment towards the organization (cf. Van Dick & Wagner, 2002).  
 
The affective side of identification vs. affective commitment. Our last analysis 
revolves around a particularly debated facet of identification: the affective one. 
Although some authors differentiate between the emotional side of identification 
and affective commitment (e.g., Johnson & Morgeson, 2005; Harris & Cameron, 
2005), it seems sensible to assume a close relationship between affective 
commitment, as used in the organizational literature, and the affective component 
of identification as proposed by SIT (Van Dick & Wagner, 2002). Yet, in practice, 
an item analysis of the instruments that assess these two constructs does not reflect 
this distinction. For instance, Ellemers’ scale of group commitment (which 
supposedly assesses the emotional side of identification) comprises three items that 
are very similar to the ones in the ACS. Table 3 presents Ellemers’ group 
commitment scale and the corresponding items in the ACS. Furthermore, the rest 
of the items in the ACS target aspects that are incorporated in the definitions of 
emotional/affective identification, as proposed by authors that distinguish among 
this type of identification and commitment. We shall illustrate this with Johnson 
and Morgeson’s definition of affective identification (2005), since we found it to 
be the most detailed one, and we shall present in parentheses the corresponding 
ACS items. Johnson and Morgeson define affective identification as “the feelings 
individuals experience about themselves in relation to the social referent and the 
value they place on that social identity (ACS 6. I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ 
to this organization; ACS 7. This organization has a great deal of personal 
meaning for me)”. They also state that “affective identification is associated with 
positive feelings about one’s membership, including pride (ACS 2. I enjoy 
discussing my organization with people outside it), enthusiasm, and a sense of 
affiliation or “belongingness” with others (ACS 5. I do not feel like ‘part of the 
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family’ at my organization; ACS 8. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my 
organization)” (Johnson & Morgenson, 2005, p.2). 
 
Table 3  
Correspondence of Group Commitment Scale - Affective Commitment Scale items 
I would like to continue working with this 
organization. 
1. I would be happy to spend the rest of my 
career with this organization 
I dislike being a member of this organization. 6. I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this 
organization 
I would rather belong to another organization. 4. I think that I could easily become as attached 
to another organization as I am to this one. 
 
Furthermore, a confirmatory factor analysis of the Group Commitment Scale 
and the Affective Commitment Scale reveals almost the same results for a one- or 
for a two-factorial solution. For the unidimensional model, the obtained 
coefficients are: Chi-square = 346.981 (0.000); NFI: 0.971, CFI: 0.975; RMSEA: 
0.123; PNFI: 0.648, PCFI: 0.650. For the two-factorial one, the coefficients are: 
Chi-square = 303.443 (0.000); NFI: 0.975, CFI: 0.978; RMSEA: 0.115; PNFI: 
0.635, PCFI: 0.637.  
Based on these content and quantitative analyses, it is not unreasonably to 
propose the use of ACS in testing Ellemers’ model of identification, instead of her 
original scale. Also, we shall further on use Mael’s OI scale instead of the self-
categorization component, the factor analysis presented.a supporting this 
replacement as well. 
To test these instrument proposals, we performed a confirmatory factor 
analysis for a one- and a three-dimensional model of identification. The 
unidimensional model assumed that self-categorization (measured with the Mael 
scale), affective identification/group commitment (measured with Meyer & Allen’s 
Affective Commitment Scale) and the evaluative side of identification/group self-
esteem (measured with Ellemers’ Group Self-Esteem Scale) are better represented 
by a single factor – similar to Van Dick and Wagner’s proposed psychological 
attachment construct. The three-dimensional model differentiates even at 
instrument-level between the three sides of identification, as proposed by several 
authors (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Ellemers et al., 1999; Harris & Cameron, 
2005), based on Tajfel’s primary definition of social identity.  
The three-factor model presented far better fit indices (Chi-square = 495.445 
(0.000); NFI: 0.860, CFI: 0.875; RMSEA: 0.078; GFI: 0.882, AGFI: 0.848, PNFI: 
0.742, PCFI: 0.770) than the unidimensional one (Chi-square = 1090.338 (0.000); 
NFI: 0.691, CFI: 0.717; RMSEA: 0.125; GFI: 0.739, AGFI: 0.669, PNFI: 0.610, 
PCFI: 0.633). As one can also notice from the visual inspection of the component 
plots resulted in an exploratory factor analysis (Figure 2), the items of the three 
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Figure 2  
Component plot of factors extracted from OIS, ACS and GSE items 
 
Our results are in line with previous conceptualizations and measurements 
proposed in the organizational identification literature (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; 
Ellemers et al., 2004). Therefore, these results offer solid ground to proceed with 
the testing of Ellemers’ model on the one hand, and to operationalize it through 
Mael’s scale for cognitive identification, ACS for affective identification, and 




Several conclusions can be drawn as a result of our analyses. On the one 
hand, we rally to the perspective that the debate between the one-dimensional vs. 
the three-dimensional conceptualization of identification can be solved by a 
mediational model (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Ellemers et al., 2004). In such a 
model, the cognitive side of identification is the primary process triggering then 
affective and self-evaluative subsequent processes. On the other hand, stopping at 
the cognitive side of identification alone deprives the concept of identification of a 
large part of its explanatory power. Therefore, the other two sides of identification, 
as postulated from the first SIT writings, should be taken into account in analyses. 
Most studies so far (see meta-analyses by Riketta, 2005) support this conclusion by 
proving that it is the affective side of organizational attachment that has the largest 
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With respect to the instruments proposed to evaluate the two OI models we 
discussed, our proposal is that, starting from the mentioned mediational model, one 
can build a combination of instruments using existing scales. We have tested and 
found strong evidence for the combination of Mael’s scale for cognitive 
identification (Organizational Identification Scale-Mael & Ashforth, 1992), 
Affective Commitment Scale (the corresponding scale from Meyer & Allen’s 1991 
Affective, Normative and Continuance Commitment Scale) for affective 
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Table 4  
Structure Matrix for the Group Identification Scale (Ellemers et al., 1999) 
 
 Forced three-factor solution 
 
Initial two-factor solution 
  1 2 3 1 2 
SCALE 7_1 .855     .854   
SCALE 7_2 .756     .745   
SCALE 7_3 .879     .876   
SCALE 7_4 .773     .780   
SCALE 7_5     .951   .569 
SCALE 7_6 .637 .670   .651 .673 
SCALE 7_7   .836   .423 .813 
SCALE 7_8 .674 .527   .688 .477 
SCALE 7_9   .781     .767 




Structure Matrix for Organizational Identification Scale and Group Identification Scale 
 
  1 2 3 
OIS 1 .598   -.376 
OIS 2 .682     
OIS 3 .825   -.481 
OIS 4 .860   -.521 
OIS 5 .877   -.528 
OIS 6 .777   -.395 
Scat 1 .567   -.849 
Scat 2 .366   -.803 
Scat 3 .549   -.876 
GrCommit 1 .510 .380 -.740 
GrCommit 2   .520   
GrCommit 3 .438 .692 -.592 
GrSE 1   .814 -.358 
GrSE 2 .504 .533 -.605 
GrSE 3   .754   
GrSE 4   .832   
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